




























































In late August 2018, Darko Milinović, 
former Croatian Minister of Health and 
the Governor of Ličko-senjska County, 
mobilized local party members for an 
unusual quest. Four buses from the prov-
ince, with about 200 people according to 
the media reports – the party members 
of the Croatian Democratic Community 
(HDZ), the leading party in the ruling 
coalition – arrived in Zagreb in front 
of the national party headquarters, to 
HOW COME A LIBERAL STILL 
BELIEVES IN DEMOCRACY?
A RIDDLE OF POLITICS 
AND FAITH
Abstract This critical essay deals with the book Can Democracy Work? by James Mi-
ller, which, warning of the problems of democratic politics, retains democratic faith. 
By combining political science and historiography, and intertwining the history of 
ideas with political biography in portraying different episodes in the history of de-
mocracy, the book seeks to give insight into the riddle of democracy. This riddle is 
exhibited in various theoretical and practical tensions: between the Rousseauian 
demand for sovereignty of the people and the general will on the one hand, and 
the Platonistic epistemic skepticism about the ability of the people to decide and 
the political demands of liberalism on the other; between the need to control the 
rulers and the political-economic dynamics of corruption and clientelism incited by 
democratic politics; between rebellion against the elites as a species of functional 
political hygiene in a polity, and uncertainty of outcomes brought by the inherent 
instability of democracy and its aptitude to excess; and between the seeming ine-
vitability of elections and their cooptational trap. Between the liberalism of fear à 
la Judith Shklar and the thrills of populism à la Chantal Mouffe, the author retains 
democratic faith – a political version of Kierkegaardian existentialism which goes 
beyond the undecided, forever doubting reflection and a political good that is sha-
red with others, in spite of the uncertainties of public opinion and the ascertained 
questionability of civic virtue in the open field of the political in history.
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protest the issues concerning intraparty 
elections and politics. Lovro Kuščević, 
the Minister of Public Administration 
and the political secretary of HDZ, ac-
cused the organizers for manipulation, 
stating that "they don't know democra-
cy".1 On the other hand, Milinović, who 
was expelled from the party, called the 
procedure of his deletion "unashamedly 
undemocratic".2
A relatively insignificant event from 
contemporary Croatian politics still 
points to big issues, both in conceptual 
history of democracy and the contem-
porary political discourse obsessed with 
it. Does democracy refer to the tidy pro-
cedure of aggregating individual wills or 
to the fuzzy expressions of collective will 
on various levels of political life? And in 
terms of Begriffsgeschichte, where Carl 
Schmitt, an astute critic of liberal demo-
cracy, diagnosed the times of neutrali-
zations and depoliticizations, the que-
stion is how come that the same actions 
are called (un)democratic by political 
opponents and antagonists, typically in 
the situations when specific criteria of 
a meritocratic or professional system to 
judge one's actions are absent? It seems 
that in the clashes of political discourse 
everyone likes to have "democracy" on 
his side.
But what is "democracy" after all? Asi-
de of the questions of grass roots acti-
ons and institutional procedures, is it 
applicable solely to demos or to the no-
toriously oligarchic parties as well, the 
particular political organizations com-
peting in the political arena with their 
general programs claiming the knowl-
edge of the common good? What does 
1 "Milinovićev čin podijelio HDZ, Kušče-
vić za njegovo izbacivanje iz stranke, no 
Kujundžić poručuje: 'Ne treba mahati sank-
cijama'", dnevnik.hr, August 30th 2018.
2 "Zaštitari na izborima: 'Koliko je trebalo 
biti demokracije na ovim izborima?'", 
dnevnik.hr, September 9th 2018.
democracy mean today and how is this 
associated to what it has meant in vari-
ous historical, cultural and geographical 
settings? Can it work?
While the answers to the former ques-
tions demand careful empirical analysis 
and theoretical prowess, the last one 
also implies a telos, a purpose, a vision 
of good life, which should be attained by 
democratic politics. Discussions of such 
big questions reveal not only one's ability 
to analyze but thus also reveal, so to say, 
one's normative persona. What does one 
aspire and what does one loathe? What 
does one inadvertently or voluntarily 
hide and reveal? What does one hope for 
or believe in? The question of democra-
cy, today as ever, is not only a question 
of political analysis, but also of values, 
identity, and even esthetics and escha-
tology of an author discussing politics. 
Histories and evaluations of democracy 
tackling these big and ages old questions 
that haunt political thought at least from 
the Greek times, could very well offer 
a full confession of a zoon politikon or, 
more humanely, a homo politicus, striv-
ing for the beautiful and the good in a 
political community. Or, perhaps, a less 
optimistic confession of the frailness of 
an attempt to offer a vindication of de-
mocracy in the context of an inability to 
provide a convincing answer about its 
future based on levelheaded evaluation 
of its historical experience.
II.
What if James Miller, a New School 
Professor and an historian of ideas, set 
out to answer these questions, offering 
a history of democracy as an idea and 
historical practice? Well, he did, and 
his interesting and sincere book, en-
compassing about 300 pages (about 250 
without endnotes), confirms this hunch: 
the book is at the same time a political 
analysis, a biography and a confession 




























































ic and Foucault's biographer who wrote 
on the lives of philosophers, is not new 
to the subject. It's his third book about 
democracy, the first one being Rousseau: 
Dreamer of Democracy (1984) published 
by Yale University Press, while the sec-
ond one, Democracy Is in the Streets (Si-
mon & Schuster 1987), republished by 
Harvard University Press (1994), dealt 
with the "miracles" and "monsters" of 
the New Left, vividly portraying radical 
leftism in the US, one of the Western 
polities that also produced its pictur-
esque soixante-huitards (Miller did par-
take in the said political carnivals). In 
other words, the author has something 
to say on the subject of democracy, judg-
ing both from his experience and his 
scholarly expertise and work.
Can democracy work? is a work of ma-
turity. It puts youth ideals on the trial of 
skepticism that one acquires with age, 
when one is more or less retired from 
the streets, rarely dreaming of person-
al future prospects and mostly look-
ing back to reassess the past. The book 
goes beyond the sometimes barren and 
abstract language of contemporary po-
litical theory. Miller's knowledge of the 
history of political ideas is paired with 
the stylistic qualities of prose and the 
richness of language. He interveawes the 
personal and the political in his narra-
tive. The book comes off neither as an 
empirically banal, recycling textbook 
interpretations, nor as a dullish pam-
phlet. As in the case of the lives of phi-
losophers from Miller's Examined Lives 
(Picador, 2012), the well-researched ep-
isodes have many intriguing facets and, 
although there are passages that do not 
lack overly archaic pathos, Miller does 
not proselytize: a seemingly Manichean 
distribution of roles is usually put down 
to earth by a skeptical nod or a touch of 
(auto)irony.
The episodes from the history of de-
mocracy are recounted in five chapters, 
with each title summing the different 
concept of democracy emerging in the 
political history of the West. The book 
also provides introductory synopses of 
the chapters, stylistically evocative of pi-
caresque novels (an old Spanish genre, 
precisely recounting life histories of the 
likeable scapegraces). As the synopsis of 
"Prelude" has it, the book deals with the 
riddle of democracy (one of the work-
ing titles of the book was "The Riddle 
of Democracy"): "The riddle posed, and 
some answers explored, in five historical 
essays" (vi). And the collaged pillar on 
the covers already reflects the variety of 
the chosen historical episodes: the as-
sembled artwork contains both bits of 
Greek alphabet and violent Delacroix's 
Liberty Leading the People on the top – 
the famous lady with a flag, a bayoneted 
musket and a nipple, paying homage to 
the French July Revolution of 1830. In 
the following sections, I will lead the 
potential reader through the content of 
the book's introduction (the mentioned 
"Prelude") and its chapters to come to 
its conclusion (the "Coda"), quite un-
settling for the uncritical proponents of 
democracy. The readers will ultimate-
ly have to decide for themselves if the 
book solves the riddle posed suggested 
already in the abstract of the essay and 
the strange lyrics, ironically evoked in 
its epigraph. On my part, I shall offer 
some reflections on the titular question 
associated both with democracy and 
with the profile of the author as a propo-
nent of political hope, still willing to use 
Whitman and Brecht in his exalted epi-
graphs albeit all the skepticism he tends 
to express.
III.
The introduction provides the usual dis-
tinctions, modest disclaimers and rea-
sonable caveats. It correctly states that 
liberalism and democracy are terms 
"almost hopelessly conflated and con-


























cal discourse; that the story recounted 
is Eurocentric and that the choice of the 
cases highly selective. The work is, as 
the author confesses, a specific product 
of an epistemological tradition of writ-
ing intellectual history and of a political 
tradition of democracy he was raised in. 
Although Miller is aware of the tensions 
and faults of that tradition, he can still 
write the introduction as a proud Amer-
ican, raised on Whitman's Democratic 
Vistas, claiming that he is "struck by the 
progress" they "have made as a nation", 
further expressing his pride with "the 
polyglot expansion of " American "citi-
zenry as a whole, and the generosity with 
which Americans, at their best, have 
conceived of popular sovereignty in plu-
ralistic terms": in Miller's eyes, "the Unit-
ed States has evolved into the world's 
most striking ongoing experiment in 
cosmopolitan self-governance" (17).
The introduction explicitly poses the 
seemingly simple question "What is de-
mocracy?" It makes some sense to re-
count Miller's preliminary suggestion 
of an answer before going to specific 
episodes. He does not provide an ab-
stract scholastic definition but points to 
a political tension, present both in my 
vignette from the European periphery 
and in the episodes analyzed. This ten-
sion appears within an ambitious swathe 
of a culture and a way of life. It is framed 
as a doubt and followed by a paradox:
Perhaps, as Tocqueville and others 
have argued, democracy isn't merely 
a form of government, it is also a way 
of life, and a shared faith, instantia-
ted in other forms of association, in 
modes of thought and belief, in the 
attitudes and inclinations of indivi-
duals who have absorbed a kind of 
democratic temperament. But how 
can democratic habits of association, 
conduct, and conviction survive in a 
setting where democracy as a poli-
tical form is honored mainly in the 
breach? (7)
I see two things important to under-
stand Miller's political effort suggest-
ed in the quoted paragraph. Following 
Tocqueville, whose historical analysis 
(even if he wasn't bashful in his gener-
alizations, as Miller observes) became a 
sort of a gospel of American democracy, 
democracy is normatively posited as a 
sort of vibrant political culture of a col-
lective that shares common future and 
faith. It refers, then, to the cultivation 
of a finer temperament, contrasted with 
the often brutal and cruel mob instincts, 
diagnosed and theorized by Gustave Le 
Bon's Psychologie des foules. It appears in 
the realm of political sociology against 
the psychology of the masses ignited 
by irresponsible, charlatan or deranged 
populist leaders. This mechanism of ma-
nipulation is in Miller's narrative associ-
ated with the "bad guys" of the chosen 
episodes from Ancient Greece to Jackso-
nian democracy in the US, providing it 
with a moralist quasi-Manichean touch 
and at the same time supplying it with 
one of the important leitmotifs that hold 
the episodes together (another one may 
be a historically grounded premonition 
about the limited lifetime of any given 
democracy).
To be sure, in Miller's narrative, it's 
never a haughty aristocratic pose despis-
ing "the great unwashed". His contempt 
is reserved for the populist irrespon-
sibility, charlatanry, demagoguery and 
scheming that gives mobs a mandate to 
do harm, and that so easily transforms 
itself to despotism when in power. And 
this seems to be morally right, about 
as Montaigne's essay against cruelty. 
However, there is more to the tension 
between political life and political form 
haunting democratic life, to which I will 





























































The title of the first chapter, "A Closed 
Community of Self-Governing Citi-
zens," summarizes, somewhat idealisti-
cally, what democracy meant in Greece. 
As the Greeks had it: "'Our city is called 
a democracy because it is governed by 
the many, not the few'" is "one of the ear-
liest, and simplest, definitions of the new 
political form" (30), that is relevant to 
this day. Many of the problems and di-
lemmas of today's democracy were also 
there at the beginning, in Athens, where 
the term and the practice was born for 
the Western political history, before the 
large democratic hiatus filled by monar-
chic political form: nativism versus the 
outsiders; military service forging fra-
ternity and citizen spirit, i.e. "democracy 
based on citizen-soldiers poised to shed 
blood" (52), as later in France; masses 
manipulated by the demagogues, all to-
gether paired with a lack of rights in spe-
cifically modern liberal constitutional 
sense, and the largely forgotten lottery 
as, when one thinks of it, logical method 
of choice, at least if political equality is 
understood as an empirical fact.
Miller notes the fact that "only a small 
fraction of the Athenian population 
participated in politics" and this came 
in hand with "[t]he myth of Athenian 
autochthony – a strong form of nativ-
ism, stressing that citizens must spring 
from the land" which "enabled even the 
poorest citizen to regard himself as well-
born" (29). Although he uses all the ca-
veats, Miller is keen to see the parallels 
between the Greek and the French case, 
Athenian democracy and the republic 
established in the course of the French 
Revolution, while further democratic 
episodes in his narrative also demon-
strate similar tensions present already in 
Athens. Among other things, he men-
tions Josiah Ober's comparison of the 
Athenian uprising of 508 B.C. and the 
storming of the Bastille (24), the volatili-
ty of the will of the demos – the "citizens 
in assembly were perfectly free to reject 
previously approved laws, even to estab-
lish completely new institutions" (36) 
– and the political problems associat-
ed with "empowering an impoverished 
multitude" (37).
Thucydides' skepticism concerning 
the "demos in action," ignited and moved 
by popular leaders such as Cleon (38), 
feels as a contemporary if not a timeless 
warning in Miller's narrative, especially 
when affiliated with David Runciman's 
general remarks echoing Plato – of how 
"democracy pandered to desire": "It gave 
people what they wanted day to day, but 
it did nothing to make sure they wanted 
the right things. It had no capacity for 
wisdom, for difficult decisions, or for 
hard truths. Democracies were founded 
on flattery and lies" (42). To this, read-
er can add Miller's skepticism towards 
Arendt's idealistic visions of Greek de-
mocracy and to her intellectual progeny 
of armchair philosophers (44), and an 
affirmative nod to Paul Cartledge's sum-
mary of Antic democratic experience as 
"participatory democracy with a ven-
geance" (48). After all, the big political 
invention did not end up in glory but 
in vulnerable and dependent shrinking 
oligarchies that withered away to be in-
corporated into larger empires.
V.
The motif of a republican military ser-
vice introduces the French case, reco-
unted under the title "A Revolutionary 
Assertion of Popular Sovereignty": "the 
French Revolution had made it clear that 
Athens would not be the last example of 
a democracy based on citizen-soldiers 
poised to shed blood. Fraternity, solida-
rity, and the kinds of virtues forged thro-
ugh conflict and struggle would prove 
alluring for a number of subsequent de-
mocrats of different persuasions" (52). 
Not surprisingly, Machiavelli's ideas 


























at Florentine political thinker's claims 
that armed people make a better army 
than shifty mercenaries and, even if very 
cautiously, the controversial concept of 
"Machiavellian democracy". However, 
the basic structure of the chapter, if one 
omits few details and focuses instead 
on the distribution of forces struggling 
in the clash of political good and evil, 
is almost opera-like in its simplicity; or, 
if one really wants to stretch the com-
parisons and put aside the many di-
fferences that spring from the usage of 
Orwell's satirical October allegory, it is 
the old Major, Napoleon and Snowball, 
transposed from an animal farm to the 
French Revolution. Let me explain this 
strange association.
Rousseau, "the Genevan-born sage" 
(whose Social Contract was banned in 
his native republic, since it was judged to 
be dangerous for the Genevan constitu-
tion) prophesized "the century of revo-
lutions" (56). His love for the people was 
recognized by Robespierre, who uttered 
many ambivalent and contradictory 
ideas about politics – e.g. Miller writes 
on his "complete about-face from the ul-
trademocratic views" (87). But as a pol-
icy practitioner, Robespierre wasn't that 
ambivalent. In the course of the French 
Revolution, democratic ideas have cor-
related with violent impulses, expressed 
by the often blood-thirsty sans-culottes 
(in Miller's opinion wrongly exculpated 
by Arendt). Rousseau's ultimate polit-
ical ideals, freedom and equality, and 
his vision of a republic with citizens as 
sovereign, making laws that express 
general will, ended up (or, more exact-
ly, began) with "a carnival of atrocities" 
(72). As the very end of the chapter has 
it, the French Revolution was "a hec-
atomb on a grand scale" (89). Unlike 
Foucault – who was ambivalent, if not 
cynical, when he discussed the bloody 
assertions of revolutionary power with 
Chomsky in the early 1970s – and Žižek 
much later, Miller abhors revolutionary 
bloodshed (like Chateaubriand in his 
days), pointing to the September Massa-
cres of 1792 and other episodes of "in-
discriminate slaughter" (74). However, 
this is not only an aesthetic sentiment, 
but a theoretical claim. Miller nods pos-
itively to Simon Schama, who posits 
an inherent tie between revolution and 
bloodshed by the masses, those by defi-
nition being opposed to the checks and 
balances of a moderate rational govern-
ment: "If Schama is correct – and I be-
lieve he is," writes Miller, "then previous 
scholars have been wrong to imply that 
the ardent desire of ordinary people for 
public freedom can be separated, in fact, 
from their willingness to use force in its 
pursuit" (72).
If Rousseau's vision can be vaguely 
associated with that of the old Major 
(Marx), and if Robespierre, the terror 
and the violent masses, can be asso-
ciated with Napoleon (the hog not the 
general), referring in Orwell's narrative 
to Stalin and the purges, who is then 
Snowball (Trotsky, hammered to death 
in Mexico) of the French Revolution? 
Maybe we could find one on closer in-
spection, but he would not be that im-
portant for Miller's narrative. The calls 
for permanent revolution cannot be 
compared with the project of a rational 
liberal-democratic constitution, and it 
is not that clear that Snowball is a good 
guy, but there is a good guy in Miller's 
chapter though. It is Marquis de Con-
dorcet, a "mathematical prodigy" and 
"methodological individualist in the 
tradition of Adam Smith" (75), who al-
ready then was a proponent of women 
rights, an enemy of slavery, and an ex-
treme skeptic in the matters of religion, 
as a posthumous biographical note put 
it (76). Condorcet, an author interested 
in the finesses of l'arthimétique politique, 
was instrumental in translating the ob-




























































general will from the Social Contract into 
French constitutional order. His mission 
was to "rationalize the drafting of laws 
for the public good" (75). His problem? 
"He knew perfectly well that his fond-
est hopes for an enlightened regime of 
political freedom had been hijacked by 
Robespierre and a few other fanatics of 
virtue" (88). His destiny? Although he 
did not end up guillotined as Robespi-
erre himself, after a period of hiding, 
Condorcet was imprisoned. He died in 
his cell, poisoned, perhaps taking poison 
voluntarily like Socrates, or simply from 
stroke: it is not clear to this day.
VI.
The next chapter discusses Miller's own 
polity, under the title "A Commer-
cial Republic of Free Individuals," that 
sums up the ideas of the founding fat-
hers – the same thing that the Canadian 
interpreter of Hobbes and Locke C. B. 
Macpherson, called "possessive indivi-
dualism". There is of course much more 
in the complex story about the nascence 
of the American republic, since, after all, 
"Republican Rome was their model, not 
Periclean Athens" (92), and Madisonian 
distrust of the people, the unconstrained 
popular sovereignty without checks and 
balances, was there from the beginning, 
echoing in Miller's own doubts about 
the real status of democracy in Ameri-
ca. In other words, the "characteristi-
cally guarded American approach to 
popular sovereignty made elections a 
crucial feature of the new regime – and 
struggles over the right to vote a focus 
of subsequent efforts to ensure that all 
Americans, regardless of race, gender, or 
wealth, felt they had standing in a repu-
blic of equals" (92).
Miller's versatility in combining histo-
ry of ideas and biographical work finds 
its focus in several important persons 
that helped to shape American demo-
cratic imaginary formed in 18th and 19th 
century. It's a motley array of revolu-
tionaries, presidents, ethnographically 
disposed aristocrats, transcendentalists 
and poets: Paine, Jackson, Tocqueville, 
Emerson, and Whitman. Thomas Paine, 
the author of the pamphlet Common 
Sense, advocated simple government 
accountable to the people, a "common-
wealth of self-reliant individuals" (93). 
Society, not the state (as in Hegel), was 
the place of freedom and happiness for 
him, a place of voluntary associations 
and organizations and market transac-
tions between individuals, i.e. the place 
of "commerce" (96), but Miller reminds 
the reader that Paine later advocated 
some rudimentary forms of social pol-
icy, such as grants and pensions funded 
by an estate tax (97).
If Paine is there to account for the 
chapter title and the early theoretical 
foundations of American polity, Jackson 
is there to demonstrate the noxious pop-
ulist dynamics as a recurring interest of 
Miller's democratic analysis. Miller is 
not lonely in not being too fond of Jack-
son, citing, among many other things, 
Jackson's support of Indian resettle-
ment, "America's unique contribution 
to the art of 'ethnic cleansing'" (110), and 
ignoring the rule of law embodied in the 
Supreme Court's decisions. Assuming 
the role of a national "tribune," Miller's 
Jackson is a figure similar to Athenian 
demagogues, mobilizing commoners 
against the elite in a new setting of a 
grand scale federal polity, "trying to turn 
the quadrennial vote for the most pow-
erful figure in the federal government 
into a national plebiscite" (112). Miller's 
interpretation of Jackson does not only 
function as a critique of Trump's presi-
dency thus far, in the ruse of an historical 
analysis; it also helps to further profile 
Miller's normative understanding of de-
mocracy, juxtaposing a culture of eman-
cipated individuals – where there are no 


























to Lincoln's definition (118) – with the 
authoritarian patterns of populist poli-
tics. Jackson is not to be revered: "one is 
struck by the discrepancy between what 
Jackson, based on the evidence, seems 
actually to have accomplished in the way 
of democratizing reforms, and the out-
size role he assumes in the national lore 
(at least the lore I was taught growing 
up about this putative hero of the com-
mon man)" (112). By the way, Miller's 
analysis of the case of Thomas Wilson 
Dorr, and the so-called Dorr Rebellion, 
associated with the struggle for suffrage 
in Rhode Island, demonstrates similar 
sentiments: a loathing of populism and 
all "venal demagogues running on disin-
genuous policy platforms" (124).
De Tocqueville, who was in a mission 
with de Beaumont to inspect the Ameri-
can prison system, met Jackson and was 
not too impressed with the finesse of 
his character and abilities. Tocqueville 
based his insights in the observations of 
"Jacksonian democracy", a term Miller 
himself uses in (scare) quotes. Howev-
er, Miller does not seem to be impressed 
with conclusions of the author, "regard-
ed as an uncanny prophet" (116), over-
prone to generalize. It is not only Toc-
queville's misfires concerning the issues 
of universal suffrage and its practices 
– Miller seems to like Lijphart's sugges-
tions to make voting in the US obliga-
tory, not a right, but a "civic duty" (123) 
– that did not stand the test of time in 
Miller's opinion. Unlike Adorno, anoth-
er American visitor much later, Miller 
did not find Tocqueville's "worries about 
conformism" reasonable: "the United 
States had already begun to elaborate a 
distinctively clamorous style of public 
culture" and "an emergent culture in-
dustry made it both possible – and prof-
itable – to market cultural artifacts that 
strove to satisfy the otherwise frustrated 
yearnings of ordinary Americans to be 
regarded as free and equal individuals, 
with cultural tastes as worthy and legit-
imate as those of any European aristo-
crat" (124).
Enter Emerson and Whitman, au-
thors immensely important to under-
stand Miller's writings on democracy in 
America. The first one "provided a qua-
si-religious sanction for the American 
cult of individualism" which justifies the 
usage of the term "Emersonian ideology" 
as opposed to the rigidities of a puritan 
religion (125). This gospel of "self-re-
liance," preached by an author whom 
Miller sees as similar to Nietzsche in 
certain aspects, was associated with civ-
il disobedience as a form of democratic 
politics.3 This phenomenon is portrayed 
affirmatively in the book, although with 
the caveat about the problem of "real 
political justice", with an accent put on 
the problem of racial discrimination. 
Namely, Miller observes how "noncon-
formism and defiant individualism can 
flourish while … the quest to create a 
more inclusive democratic society lan-
guishes" (128). Whitman who, paradox-
ically (perhaps as Miller himself), saw 
the development of "perfect individu-
alism" as the telos of democracy (130), 
"had exalted America's democracy as he 
had experienced it inwardly, as a kind of 
sublime pantheism, egalitarian in sub-
stance and cosmic in scope" (129). Mill-
er acutely notes the interesting discrep-
ancy between Whitman's hymns and 
the disgust he expressed in private let-
ters with his "dark-skinned compatriots 
who were intoxicated by their first taste 
3 To be sure, Nietzsche was no democrat at 
all. Socrates, Jesus, Luther and Rousseau 
belonged to the same democratic lot (die 
vier großen Demokraten; Nietzsche 1887a) 
as, in Nietzsche's equation, proponents of 
equality, epistemic or political, religious or 
secular. To him, democracy is a sign of soci-
etal decadence, a political form that is both 
an introduction to anarchy and an equiva-
lent to misarchism, hate of the many for the 





























































of political power" (130), the disgust 
similar to Miller's when he discusses 
historical cases of various politically ig-
nited mobs, be it Athenians led by dem-
agogues or blood-thirsty sans-culottes 
of the French Revolution. They seem 
to fit in Whitman's definition of "many 
wild brutes let loose" (130).
VII.
The fourth chapter, "A Struggle for Po-
litical and Social Equality," returns the 
narrative back to the old continent, 
dealing with the Chartists and the cha-
racters such as Marx, Mazzini, Michels 
and Weber. The first political group 
expectedly did not fare to well by Miller's 
standards, since they treated "the Jaco-
bin constitution of 1793 as sacred scrip-
ture" and "idolized Robespierre" (135). 
Their "promises were, in a strong sense, 
democratic – but their methods were in-
creasingly revolutionary and hinged on 
the actions of a relatively small minority 
of committed militants" (139). Marx is 
treated without awe, in the recognizable 
style Miller employed in the book about 
philosophers, dissecting their biograp-
hies in defiance to any mind-numbing 
sacralisation. Marx "felt that democracy 
was not an end in itself but only a means 
toward the ultimate aim of fully realizing 
human freedom in a peaceful society of 
equals" (142), and "he speculated that 
an economy organized on egalitarian 
principles would, eventually, be able to 
do without the hierarchical methods 
of command and control characteristic 
even of representative governments like 
that of the United States" (143). A history 
of Yugoslav self-management might add 
to this theme: long ago Miller was a fan 
of that literature but soon enough he got 
disenchanted with that "brand of cynical 
Marxism", as he explained to me in an 
e-mail. In any case, he still seems to be 
fond enough of Hegel and a connoisseur 
of the rationalist history of ideas whi-
ch helps him delineate Marx from the 
shady milieu of secret societies, anarc-
hist bombs and insurrections:
Marx abhorred the votaries of con-
spiratorial insurrection – Blanqui, 
Bakunin, the whole lot. Their secret 
societies and obsessive scheming 
offended his core rationalism and his 
(Hegelian) hope that the sharp, open 
conflict produced by truly popular 
social movements would produce, in 
time, and in the crucible of civil wars, 
new men and new women, equipped 
to establish a new world of emanci-
pated, and enlightened, equals. (154)
Not surprisingly, the negative minor 
character here is Raoul Rigault, an out-
spoken atheist and revolutionary, master 
of the manipulative art of rhetoric and 
a bon-vivant, a small scale Robespierre 
of Paris Commune, a principal of police 
terror, executions and feasts, "legendary 
for his outlandish tabs (one breakfast af-
ter a long night supposedly consisted of 
two fine Burgundies and Chateaubriand 
aux truffes)" (153). Speaking of the good 
and the bad guys within this chapter, 
Miller seems to be much more conge-
nial to Giuseppe Mazzini than to Marx. 
Mazzini, an Italian republican and one 
of the key characters in the unification 
of Italy, whom Marx understood as a 
reactionary, noticed the discrepancy be-
tween the egalitarianism of Christianity 
and the hierarchical nature of political 
societies. In Schmittian terms, it might 
be said that Mazzini offered a sort of po-
litical theology of democracy, deriving 
the principles of national politics from 
the sacral grounding premises of the 
Christian doctrine: "We cannot logically 
declare the children of God to be equal 
before God and unequal before men", he 
stated (145).
Opposing Marxism, Mazzini mused 
on the gradual change – the evolution of 
societies and human species, against the 


























Paris Commune. Miller seems to follow 
him, opposing the carnivals of violence. 
In Miller's meta-narrative that cuts 
across the historical episodes, they are 
associated with a formula of "delirious 
community of equals" (151). It is one of 
the possible succinct definitions of de-
mocracy Miller plays against. While I 
doubt that the party members from the 
buses in the introduction were delirious, 
they might still fall into this camp of 
democratic phenomenology, associated 
with temporary intoxicating moments of 
fraternity on various levels. It is Le Bon's 
material, often with lots of corpses on 
the barricades, similar to those beneath 
Delacroix's Liberty's nipple. However, 
Miller also notices a paradox of chang-
es associated with bloody revolutions 
(a sort of historical dialectics, although 
he doesn't use such language): fear of 
violence and popular pressures bring 
up changes to political order, which 
is a point traditionally made by Marx-
ists who tend to notice that violence is 
a midwife of the new order. In another 
paradox characteristic for a democratic 
believer, he seems to be abhorred with 
violence but still thrilled by the oppor-
tunity democratic moments bring to 
political history. In one of the possible 
readings, the ambivalences of democra-
cy trump the quasi-Manichaeism of po-
litical actors spawned by the democratic 
moments and the liberal from the title 
of the essay perhaps appears more dem-
ocratic than he is willing to admit, warts, 
populism and all.
Enter modern political parties, orga-
nizations unbeknownst to the Greeks. 
They open the questions of political 
form and content, partially intimated 
in the beginning of this essay: "Should 
a party that advocated democracy orga-
nize itself democratically? Did it matter 
if its rhetoric was revolutionary while 
its policies were reformist?" (159) Many 
figures appear in association to these 
problems, such as Eduard Bernstein and 
Rosa Luxemburg, rising broader issues 
about the relationship between socialism 
and democracy, as in the famous "gene-
alogy" written by Laclau and Mouffe. 
However, the lead role belongs to Robert 
Michels, an observer of actual practices 
of social democracy that exemplified the 
discrepancy between socialism and de-
mocracy, equated in a naive idealist un-
derstanding of some of the proponents 
of socialism. Michels, under influence 
of Pareto and Mosca, was famous for his 
formulation of the iron law of oligarchy, 
which is in accord with their theory of 
elites that, as ever, successfully eschew 
nominally democratic forms. Miller 
rightly finds great interest in the long-
term correspondence between Michels 
and Weber, "a priceless record of how 
two astute observers viewed the modern 
struggle for political and social equality, 
and the divergent ways they evaluated 
its prospects" (167).
Weber, a diagnostician of the fossil-
ized Western civilization, explained to 
his young and still idealistic syndicalist 
friend, how Rousseauian notions of the 
will of the people are but fictions. If one 
does not to adhere to revolutionary eth-
ics of the will, formally a secular variant 
of the Sermon on the Mount, as is Kant's 
categorical imperative, one must accept 
"the sociological conditions underlying 
all 'technologies,' be they economic, po-
litical, or whatever" (168-169), which 
makes talk of revolution a (farcical) uto-
pian call. Weber's patronizing is not the 
whole story, assuming a recognizable 
form of a dialogue between an older 
(complacent) cynic and a younger (na-
ive) idealist who will grow up (both of 
course bourgeois). An unexpected par-
allel emerges, accentuating another pos-
sible normative layer in Miller's complex 
narrative: "Weber could see the advan-
tage of handing effective political power 




























































gogues, just as Athens had handed pow-
er to Pericles, who was able, according 
to Thucydides, to harness productively 
the otherwise dangerous passions of un-
ruly and uninformed citizens" (170). To 
put it differently, it comes down to good 
leadership (for Weber, this was paired 
with political ethics of responsibility) 
in "[t]he democratic currents of histo-
ry", which "resemble successive waves" 
where, as Michels further observed, 
revolutionary leaders become the part 
of a new establishment to be in "turn 
attacked by fresh opponents who appeal 
to the name of democracy", which lead 
him to a somewhat mystical conclusion: 
"It is probable that this cruel game will 
continue without end" (172).
VIII.
The last of the chapters, "A Hall of Mi-
rrors," is the first one with a composite 
metaphorical layer in the title, possibly 
referring not only to Versailles, but also 
to the structure of the chapter, where 
narrative jumps from America to Eu-
rope, from the United States to Russia. 
The chapter deals with Wilson and Le-
nin – the two champions of quite diffe-
rently understood right of self-determi-
nation – with Bernays (a bad guy) and 
Lippmann and Dewey (the good guys). 
Moreover, the mirrors might also refer 
to the mirrors of democratic experience 
across history, which is repetitively por-
trayed in the book, in a sort of structure 
of fugue, where similar musical motifs 
are repeated and reworked as democra-
cy as the rule of the people is, in new 
historical and geographical settings.
Wilson, a professor of politics at 
Princeton and university's president – 
the first and thus far last American pres-
ident with a PhD, as Miller notices (174) 
– had a lofty vision of "a concert of dem-
ocratic nations, each one established 
through a democratic process of self-de-
termination", but Miller is also quick to 
notice his parochialism when Wilson 
deals with democracy in Europe, as well 
as his "white supremacist assumptions" 
(177). In the choice between natural ar-
istocracy (Adams) and plebeian democ-
racy (Jackson), Wilson is closer to the 
former option. During his times, one 
can observe the formation of a gap, very 
important in Miller's opinion, between 
the discourse of democracy and actual 
practices of governing, associated with 
the development of federal bureaucra-
cy, the ambitious policing schemes and 
the imperatives of secrecy associated 
with the maintenance of national se-
curity. The Patriot Act is nothing new, 
in other words. It is a part of a century 
old American tradition. Together with 
Weberian concept of bureaucracy and 
the distinction between politics and 
administration (a founding moment of 
the Wilsonian science of administra-
tion), another Weberian uneasy motif 
appears. The Führerdemokratie shows 
up in Miller's narrative about Wilson, 
and he even sees Wilson's war speech 
as "a fine example of an eloquent dem-
agogue in full oratorical flight" (181). 
"God helping her, she can do no other," 
Wilson concluded his speech, and Mill-
er added: "The final, Protestant flour-
ish is telling" (181). Indeed it is, as yet 
another example of Miller's analytical 
heed for the issues of political spiritual-
ity which I discuss at the very end, and 
of the normative complexity of the nar-
rative where leadership appears both as 
necessary and dangerous for democracy. 
And that is another democratic aporia 
or antinomy (the reader may choose) – 
a "tension" that continues the list offered 
in the abstract of the essay.
The account of Soviet experience is 
intertwined with biographic bits on Le-
nin, a strategist of a great willpower as 
described by Gorky (187). The result 
did not fare to well on the test of dem-


























tarian and peasant democracy; in real-
ity, a new state ruled by one party, the 
Bolsheviks, and, ultimately, by one man" 
(189). It was a dictatorship, but this is 
not especially new or controversial find-
ing. Much more interesting are Miller's 
discussions about the relationship be-
tween public opinion and democracy. 
The problem is not only in the biased 
media, the said secretive bureaucracy, 
and various manipulative political ac-
tors, but also in the stereotypes that in-
fluence the political thinking of the citi-
zens. No wonder that Walter Lippmann 
appears as a skeptical hero in Miller's 
narrative. His analyses seem to put En-
lightenment dreams of Condorcet & co. 
to serious test, but one of the proposed 
solutions, setting hope on the "trained 
civil servants with an in-depth knowl-
edge of the facts pertinent to formulat-
ing reasonable public policies" (201), is 
not unambivalently comforting (in the 
literature about critical policy analysis, 
which I happen to know quite well, this 
is criticized "technocracy"). In any case, 
Lippmann's well-known idealist coun-
terpart, who with Wilson (and Miller) 
shared a vision of democracy, under-
standing it as "a matter of shared faith" 
(201), is James Dewey. Dewey's broad 
understanding of democracy infused 
Miller's initial answer with even more 
religious overtones. Democracy was "a 
kind of church writ large, a communion 
of souls sharing the same faith in free-
dom and equality and fraternity" (202). 
However, Miller is quick to see the prob-
lem. Dewey does not refute Lippmann 
empirically, as Miller's notices, and his 
skeptical face thus shows itself in an as-
sessment of Dewey's visions: it's "Em-
erson and Whitman redux: democracy 
in America as a 'state of vision,' an elu-
sive dream, a redemptive ideal, yet still 
worth struggling toward, even against 
the current of events" (203).
Edward Bernays, cherished as rever-
ent figure, at least in the Croatian pub-
lic relations milieu and establishments4, 
appears in a very negative light. Miller 
portrays him as a sort of a cynical ma-
nipulator in a post-truth world avant 
la lettre – the world, in Bernays' own 
words, of "the so-called truths by which 
society lives" which "are born of com-
promise among conflicting desires and 
of interpretation by many minds" (204). 
This also brings out yet another seman-
tic facet to the title: "At Versailles, the 
Hall of Mirrors was a symbol of absolute 
power, with the long corridor of mirrors 
reflecting a controlled landscape that, 
seen through the windows on the other 
side, seemed to stretch to infinity. What 
Bernays had called the 'mirrors of the 
public mind' evoked not Versailles but a 
fun house maze" (205). Need it be said 
that this metaphor, evoking an older al-
legory of the cave, does not sound too 
good for democracy?
However, even if democracy often 
appears as a sham, especially when as-
sessed by more ambitious criteria, Mill-
er, still a skeptical proponent of Enlight-
enment (I think), sticks to the project, 
since even this "'sham'" "represents an 
epochal transformation": "the rulers of 
every contemporary regime that pro-
fesses democratic values, however fee-
bly realized, must periodically face the 
mundane threat posed by ordinary citi-
zens, however uninformed, periodically 
queuing at a polling station, to exercise 
their right to vote, and so to transfer 
power, if they choose, to an entirely new 
set of political leaders" (211).
IX.
"The Coda" tries to provide an answer to 
Huntington's question of "Who are we?", 
4 One private higher education institution in 
Zagreb bears his name: "Edward Bernays 
University College", offering degrees in 





























































a question that much haunts Miller and 
other Americans for the last several de-
cades. Miller, himself being involved in 
the activities of the anti-Trump opposi-
tion, offers a piece of prose reflecting the 
current political moment. However, the 
text is once again ironic and skeptical. 
In lack of a better interlocutor, old Mi-
ller speaks to the young Miller here, as 
Weber does to Michels. It is a testimony 
of a young leftist idealist who with age 
turned into a more conservative politi-
cal adult. It is a political coming of age 
essay. To be sure, the portrait of Trump 
is not flattering. Miller doesn't seem to 
like him: "A cartoon of self-reliant coc-
kiness, the candidate adored being the 
center of attention and, like a louche 
comedian, merrily defying the norms 
of civil discourse" (214). There is much 
more, but the point is in the wider pi-
cture Miller draws, transforming the 
recent American experience into anot-
her vignette in the history of democracy. 
Protesters against Trump on the streets 
of New York shouted "This is what de-
mocracy looks like!", but Miller, himself 
part of the crowd, was mature enough 
to understand the similar sentiments 
of their political opponents. He and his 
co-protesters felt as "people in a bitterly 
divided country feeling like strangers in 
their own land" (216), but so did many 
others after Obama's two successive 
elections: "Now it was my turn" (217), 
Miller observed. Moreover, he also un-
derstood that it was American identity 
at stake in these struggles, generating 
tensions and challenges for American 
democracy, and he turned to Samuel 
Huntington to look for the answers.
Rereading of Huntington today may 
appear as common sense, but it is a 
controversy at least in the New School 
milieu. What once angered the young 
Miller, became a set of "sensible obser-
vations" (217) for the old Miller. It is 
not capitalist economy but democratic 
politics producing conflict, Huntington 
fathomed in the 1970s, as Miller does 
now. Add to this Huntington's omi-
nous implications that, as in some neg-
ative eschatology of political decadence, 
American democracy does not have 
the freshest outlook: that what seemed 
preposterous and absurd to young Mill-
er now becomes sensible, namely the 
idea that perhaps "John Adams had been 
right to warn, almost two hundred years 
ago (roughly the life span of the Athe-
nian democracy), that 'there never was 
a democracy yet that did not commit 
suicide'" (218).
Huntington is another prodigy in 
Miller's story, as Condorcet was in his 
times – a conservative who saw West-
Point as "a bit of Sparta in the midst of 
Babylon", a remark that, in one of Mill-
er's ironical quips, disabled Huntington 
to teach at Harvard, at least right away, 
since he still ended there, at the richest 
and probably most prestigious Amer-
ican university, "after only five years in 
the wilderness, teaching at Columbia" 
(221). Huntington, perceived by the 
young leftists as a war criminal, had his 
portion of graffiti on his house (in a fin-
er version of the similar political senti-
ment, Chomsky saw him as one of the 
mandarins of new American power). 
Skeptical and far-sighted in the realm 
of international relations, unlike his tri-
umphant Hegelian student Fukuyama 
back in the early 1990s, Huntington saw 
the rise of power of China and Islamic 
world, leading him to conclude that rea-
sonable (American) politics would have 
to eschew universalism (223), perhaps 
just another, finer name for the failed 
project of global empire. Parallel to his 
analysis of international relations, Hun-
tington's last book dealt with American 
identity, providing the title to Miller's 
coda. In that book, Huntington tried 
to take into account "the long-term im-


























trends on America's sense of national 
identity" (224).
Miller's reading of Huntington, who 
back then saw prospects of "white na-
tivism" in the United States, is not too 
reassuring for American democratic 
prospects. American identity, historical-
ly speaking, was not at all universal but 
more or less white, Anglo-Saxon prot-
estant, paired with democratic ideology 
that produced conflicts (225). Political 
skeptics, and political believers with 
skeptical face such as Miller, recognize 
Huntington's historical lesson that po-
litical principles are not enough to keep 
the polity together. Huntington wasn't 
optimistic at all: "For Samuel P. Hun-
tington at the end of his life, this is what 
American democracy looked like: a 
fragile ideology, with cloudy prospects" 
(226).
And Miller? A disappointed radical 
democrat of the 1960s, rooted his skep-
ticism in personal political experience – 
"my own experiments in radical democ-
racy quickly fell apart, as my friends and 
I tired of the endless meetings and sup-
pressed disagreements that the quest for 
consensus entailed" (228). The author of 
Can Democracy Work? is thus aware that 
the efforts such as the Occupy move-
ment most probably will not produce a 
set of viable alternative institutions. The 
account of his own experience of direct 
democratic failures helps him to finally 
tie together the whole narrative about 
historical democratic episodes:
Instead of single-mindedly pursuing 
a new form of "collective thinking" 
through endless meetings meant 
to forge consensus – a quixotic and 
self-destructive goal that led astray 
the sans-culottes in 1793, the soviets 
in 1905 and 1917, and the New Left 
of the 1960s – I think we would do 
better to explore new ways to foster 
a tolerant ethos that accepts, and can 
acknowledge, that there are many in-
compatible forms of life and forms of 
politics, not always directly democra-
tic or participatory, in which humans 
can flourish. This, in part, is what I 
understand by the aspiration to cre-
ate a liberal democracy. (234)
The finale of the book is not too re-
assuring, offering parallels between 
radical democrats and populist leaders 
not protesting against democracy but 
against its limits. Dahl's and other com-
prehensive definitions of democracy, 
such as the one employed by the Vari-
eties of Democracy project (V-Dem), 
include liberal components, and Miller 
reminds us that illiberal doesn't mean 
undemocratic. Ultimately, democracy, 
in the more mundane repetition of the 
introductory motif, emerges not only 
as a name or an ideology, but also as 
"a moral vision, of free institutions as a 
better solution to the problems of hu-
man coexistence than the authoritarian 
alternatives" (240), threatened today as 
the Enlightenment project championed 
by Condorcet and others. Secretive bu-
reaucracy and PR operations manipu-
lating public opinion, as in Habermas' 
early critique of contemporary public 
sphere, contribute to a world of "disin-
formation" loved by "suspicious, even 
paranoid" recipients (244). A bleak out-
look, which still doesn't liberate Miller 
from his democratic faith: "however 
skeptically, and knowing that these 
words represent a riddle, not a recipe", 
he evokes "Abraham Lincoln's charac-
teristically American hope, especially in 
the darkest of times: 'that government of 
the people, by the people, for the people 
shall not perish from the earth'" (245).
X.
I am indeed not sure if the book ultima-
tely solves the riddle of democracy. I am 
not even sure that author had such an 




























































it offer a clear and simple normative so-
lution? Not quite. There is no "recipe". 
However, in the final assessment, it can 
be said that the book instead issues a re-
asonable skeptical warning and a sincere 
confession.
Can Democracy Work? offers a history 
of democratic and despotic episodes, a 
set of comparisons and parallels, empir-
ically informed insights in the genre of 
history of ideas, biography and political 
history. It is penned by an old skeptic 
still wanting to believe in democracy, 
warning the reader of its pitfalls. It skill-
fully poses the problem of democracy, 
by warning about its dark side, its (auto)
destructive force coming out of the un-
healthy association of demagogues and 
mobs but it also offers some enthusiasm 
for the possibilities opened by the dem-
ocratic vistas. In the end, Miller per-
haps wrote a book that more resembles 
a repetitive fugue than to an evolving 
genealogy, a recollection of democrat-
ic episodes perhaps making a step for-
ward in history with vague promises of 
collective freedom and empowerment, 
but too often mutating into destructive 
hecatombs. Since people seem to have 
passions and interests, and society is not 
and cannot be an impassioned scholas-
tic seminar, as Miller's historical analysis 
exemplifies, Miller's more precise solu-
tion, as far as one can surmise, would 
not propose a Habermasian deliberative 
democracy for democracy to work. He 
seems to be quite clear about that. Gen-
erally speaking, he also doesn't seem to 
buy the story of positively reevaluating 
populism, a taming of the notoriously 
violent Schmittian political proposed by 
Laclau and Mouffe. As he seems to ab-
hor the occasional cruelty of the masses, 
or doesn't see the constructive point in 
the direct democratic discussions, he 
as well despises the facility of armchair 
philosophy dealing with democracy, ig-
noring its real historical dynamics.
Capitalism is also not the one to 
blame. Miller seems to follow Hun-
tington in putting democracy first in 
some situations: democracy is the cause, 
not the effect. Unlike some other New 
School professors, like Nancy Fraser, he 
does not muse against progressive liber-
alism. (He may well be one of them pro-
gressive liberals – a Deweyan optimist.) 
As Rousseau himself, Miller is not a 
theorist of political economy. The story 
about hegemonic bloc associated with 
the destruction of the middle class, to be 
politically assailed with justice as recog-
nition and (re)distribution (from the ac-
ademic corridors), is simply not his cup 
of tea. He is no social justice warrior as, 
on the other hand, a vision of democra-
cy as a militaristic ethnic nativist band 
of brothers is as far as possible from his 
normative universe of the true and the 
good. Moreover, it seems to me that 
Miller doesn't attempt to solve the riddle 
by the means of a theory of distributive 
justice: the problem of who should get 
what and when – and how this should be 
solved, e.g. by market, love, religion, war, 
struggle, collective will (or whatever) – is 
not his problem. As he is no Rawls, he is 
no Alasdair MacIntyre. He doesn't seem 
to have a substantive telos in the sense of 
a "comprehensive doctrine". He is a lib-
eral. His darling metaphor is hijacking: 
democracy is hijacked by the bad guys, 
violent fanatics or simply sadists. It's an 
old threat lurking from the Greek times 
when democracy sentenced Socrates to 
death, suggesting it can become a bigger 
tyranny than any oligarchy. Can Democ-
racy Work? is in that sense also a story of 
various hijackers destroying liberal pro-
tections far beyond the episodes of civic 
or intraparty disobedience, employing 
buses or provisional protest tents.
However, all that said, Miller still pro-
fesses a democratic faith in the tradition 
of Whitman and Dewey. He shares a 


























ture, maybe hopelessly intertwined with 
liberalism, perhaps a telos itself, elusive 
and uncertain, as Whitman's visions. 
This is not a forced reading. Albeit the 
skeptical irony and self-awareness of 
ethnocentric, even idiosyncratic na-
ture of this faith, or perhaps any faith, 
Miller's democratic belief is clearly ex-
pressed. It is a paradox of credo quia ab-
surdum. With a reference to Whitman 
and a question mark, Miller still sees 
democracy as "future-oriented" (10), 
as any faith is, and starts his story with 
a rational reflection upon his political 
faith: "it is also a deeply personal nar-
rative, if only because I am inescapably 
the product of a typically modern dem-
ocratic faith that was drummed into me 
from birth. This makes it hard for me to 
draw a sharp line between my consid-
ered political beliefs and an internalized 
ideology that, in fact, typifies the present 
age" (12).
It then remains to be answered at the 
end of this essay what is the nature of 
this faith, surviving even the dark fina-
le of the book? It is perhaps something 
typically American, as Miller again ad-
mits at the very end. There is historical 
and personal dimension to this ques-
tion of faith. In the third chapter, Mill-
er reminds the reader that Tocqueville 
saw "America's political piety at work", 
observing a "civic religion, rooted in 
a Protestant form", a species of demo-
cratic and republican Christianity: he 
understood this as a moderating fac-
tor, "a brake on the potential wildness 
of self-reliant self-rule" (115). However, 
when bereft of pathos, a much bleaker 
outlook of a tyranny, not of state but of 
society, could emerge, following another 
Tocqueville's insight. Instead of a socie-
tal culture working against political tyr-
anny, one can imagine a society self-sat-
isfied and unaware of its own potential 
for tyranny, quite zealous to uphold to 
its tradition of witch hunts. It need not 
be religious: a secularized puritanism 
will easily find new witches to hunt. In 
other words, a democratic society may 
not constitute a brake but a fuel for the 
fire of despotism. This is not problem 
that, in my opinion, preoccupies Miller 
seriously enough. Be it as it may, a his-
torical sociology of political religions 
could tell a part of the story about this 
democratic faith since the sources of the 
self are historical, cultural and politi-
cal. And the personal dimension of the 
faith?
Miller is not shy about it. When he 
writes of Mazzini, "[t]he child of a Jaco-
bin father and a Jansenist mother" who 
"tried to reconcile the democratic prin-
ciples of his father with the austere faith 
of his mother" (145), it almost reads 
like an oblique autobiographic refer-
ence. On the one side, it's the story of 
the father, not a fully-fledged Jacobin 
to be sure, but an academic expert on 
Whitman. Miller was "raised to revere 
Walt Whitman" whose "strange vision" 
of democracy, in Miller's interpretation, 
becomes "a prophecy, a voice raised to 
keep faith with a future to which our 
shared past has committed us", and "a 
supreme fiction," with a reference to 
elusive "orgastic future" from Fitzger-
ald's The Great Gatsby: "But this is what 
democracy in America often seems like: 
an elusive fantasy, forever out of reach, 
forever unrealized, even as its most elo-
quent bards, trapped in their own prej-
udices, are 'borne ceaselessly back into 
the past'" (131). And how can we reach 
the author's mother? If the book has a 
prelude and a coda, Dewey is, musically 
speaking, the bridge between democra-
cy and religion, leading us to the part of 
the story about the mother. Miller writes 
about Dewey's "disarming candor"; 
Dewey was a philosopher of democracy, 
but "explicit about the religious motives 
behind an ostensibly scientific theory", 




























































succeed "in pointing out the religious 
meaning of democracy" (202).
On the other side of this Deweyan 
bridge, we can then see how the moth-
er sets the tone. She provides the spirit 
to infuse the democratic form with a 
religious belief, as Dewey tried to do. 
Miller writes: "And I was taught that I 
had a duty (my mother believed it was 
God-given) to make this exceptional 
society an even better place, in part by 
exercising my political rights, not only 
to vote but also to think for myself and 
to speak out against perceived injus-
tices" (7). Democracy is a moral duty 
in the historical struggle for justice. But 
will the good prevail in this Manichean 
story that suddenly acquires an almost 
eschatological telos? An anecdote may 
help here. I remember how, after a sym-
posium in his apartment, Miller pointed 
to the apocalyptic illustrations in a re-
printed 16th century Lutheran Bible, and 
exclaimed, perhaps ironically: "These 
are my people".5 Democratic faith, in 
this strange perspective, appears like 
a political sublimation of a mysterium 
coniunctionis, a mystical synthesis of 
the opposites in the familial tree of life: 
"father" and "mother," bringing together 
hope for democracy with some hints of 
a dark eschatology. A secularized faith 
in liberal democracy is still religious in 
its spiritual core.
5 In case the reader is still wondering how 
come I wrote such a lengthy essay concer-
ning yet another book on democracy: I've 
spent two autumn semesters as a visiting 
scholar at the New School. Miller was my 
academic host, I read the book before pub-
lication and I am credited in the acknowl-
edgments. If there was a Dionysian social-
ism, referring to the fact that Praxis school 
philosophers and their German colleagues 
periodically discussed the intricacies of 
"Being" with the little help of red wine, Mill-
er's symposia can perhaps be described as a 
species of Dionysian liberalism. No wonder 
that they did not take place on Korčula or 
in Dubrovnik, but in a small Manhattan 
apartment crammed with books and CDs.
Albeit all the skepticism, Miller is still 
able to project hope on the American 
democratic project. He warns us, associ-
ating this with Wilson's understanding 
of democracy, that democracy rests on 
public opinion as do the interpretations 
of no less than our "deepest moral and 
political convictions": "Unlike Martin 
Luther, Woodrow Wilson was taking 
a stand on shifting sands" (182). That 
may be the most important single sen-
tence in the whole book. It points to 
the riddle of democratic faith. How can 
one believe when a history of collective 
visions of justice and good life of Rous-
seauians giving themselves to each and 
every other citizen at the same time, 
and thus in theory not giving oneself 
to no one, looks like a history of those 
foolish enough to give themselves to 
demagogues and despots, witch-hunts 
and propaganda? In other words, what 
a strange faith, to entrust oneself to the 
whims of a historical political mecha-
nism built on shifting sands, certainly 
not stranger than a belief in God. To 
justify the belief in democracy with its 
record of hecatombs becomes almost a 
theodicy, an old and demanding spiritu-
al sport of justifying the belief in God in 
spite of all the suffering in the history of 
the world.
Unlike Ken Toole's Ignatius Reilly, 
lamenting on the horrors of decadence 
brought about by democracy in Amer-
ica, there are those still dreaming, at 
least because they cannot see a viable 
alternative, as the theodicies have no 
choice but to accept this world with all 
its horrors. This is the book for them. It 
is not a condemnation of a farcical "con-
federacy of dunces" but an exercise in 
political spirituality. It espouses a belief 
in democracy after all – a belief which 
is, to be sure, bereft of all rationalistic 
protection of the American reception 
of French Hegelianism. It is a pure pro-


























neither Kojève's history vindicating its 
own rationality, as Fukuyama, a recent 
theorist of political decay, ended his still 
most famous book, nor a sad time from 
the vantage point of political boredom, 
as he intimated earlier in his famous 
article. The wedding of a historical 
Weltgeist and American democracy has 
ended up in a divorce. The ambitions of 
Can Democracy Work? are thus much 
more modest. It is a testimony of a frag-
ile democratic faith in the times of Hun-
tington's clash. The sympathetic readers 
may only hope that democracy will pre-
vail and that the clash will not turn into 
a tangible apocalypse prophesized by 
religious eschatologies as depicted in an 
illustrated Lutherbibel.
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Kako to da liberal još uvijek vjeruje u demokraciju?  
Zagonetka politike i vjere
Povodom knjige Jamesa Millera
Može li demokracija biti djelotvorna?  
Kratka povijest radikalne ideje od antičke Atene do danas
New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2018.
Sažetak Ovaj se kritički esej bavi knjigom Može li demokracija biti djelotvorna? Ja-
mesa Millera koja, upozoravajući na probleme demokratske politike, zadržava de-
mokratsku vjeru. Kombinirajući političku znanost i historiografiju te ispreplećući 
povijest ideja i političke biografije u prikazu različitih epizoda u povijesti demokra-
cije, knjiga nastoji dati uvid u zagonetku demokracije. Ta se zagonetka pokazuje u 
različitim teorijskim i praktičkim napetostima: između rusoovskog zahtjeva za su-
verenošću naroda i općenite volje s jedne strane te platonističke epistemičke skep-
se prema sposobnosti naroda da odlučuje i političkih zahtjeva liberalizma s druge 
strane; između potrebe za kontrolom vladajućih i političkoekonomske dinamike 
korupcije i klijentelizma koju potiče demokratska politika; između pobuna protiv 
elita kao nekovrsne političke higijenske funkcije poretka i neizvjesnih ishoda koje 
donosi inherentna nestabilnost i sklonost demokracije ekscesima te između izgled-
ne nezaobilaznosti izbora i njihove kooptacijske zamke. Između liberalizma straha 
na tragu Judith Shklar i populističkog uzbuđenja na tragu Chantal Mouffe, autor 
zadržava demokratsku vjeru – političku inačicu kjerkagorovskog egzistencijalizma 
koji stupa s onu stranu neodlučne, vječito sumnjajuće refleksije i političko dobro 
koje se dijeli s drugima, unatoč svim neizvjesnostima javnog mnijenja i dokazane 
upitnosti građanske vrline u otvorenom polju političkog u povijesti.
Ključne riječi demokracija, liberalizam, zagonetka, genealogija, populizam, javno 
mnijenje

